Reports

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)Emergency Non-Congregate Sheltering (NCS) Interim Policy104-009-18 (Interim Policy) provided an adequate and effectiveframework during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, theInterim Policy waived the existing pre-approval requirement,allowing for faster and increased NCS implementation tosegregate individuals and families and limit spread of thedisease. The Interim Policy also included program details andrequirements for determining eligible work and costs for NCS inresponse to federally declared disasters during the COVID-19pandemic.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not always implement effective internal controls to provide oversight of COVID-19 Funeral Assistance. FEMA’s funeral assistance program greatly expanded the universe of reimbursable expenses for deaths related to COVID-19, even beyond those specifically identified as ineligible under established FEMA policy, without establishing guardrails to ensure relief was limited to necessary expenses and serious needs as required by statute.

Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) worked with its strategic partners to deliver critical medical supplies and equipment in response to COVID-19, FEMA did not effectively manage the distribution process. Specifically, FEMA did not use the Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS), its system of record for managing the distribution process, to track about 30 percent of the critical medical resources shipped, as required.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not provide sufficient oversight of Project Airbridge, a COVID-19 initiative. Under unprecedented pressure to mitigate disruptions in global medical supply chains, FEMA established Project Airbridge.

Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) processed and obligated funds timely to other Federal agencies (OFA), it did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure OFAs used pandemic funding as required. Specifically, FEMA did not develop detailed cost estimates when initially establishing MAs, validate unliquidated and open obligations throughout the MA lifecycle, and verify cost eligibility against Public Assistance guidance before closing the MA.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls to prevent state workforce agencies (SWA) from paying more than $2.6 million in Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) for potentially fraudulent claims made by Department of Homeland Security employees, or claimants who fraudulently used the identities of DHS employees to obtain LWA benefits.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls that may have prevented the 21 state workforce agencies (SWA) in our review from distributing more than $3.7 billion in improper payments through its Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided approximately $49.3 million of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic relief funds to Springfield, MA; Coeur D’Alene, ID; Sheridan County, NE; Marion County, GA; White Earth Nation in Minnesota; and Jicarilla Apache Nation in New Mexico.

The objective was to conduct an unannounced inspection of Folkston Processing Center and Folkston Annex to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards.

The objective was to determine the extent to which the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) mitigates safety risks by testing migrants for COVID-19 before transport on domestic commercial flights and whether a process is in place for escorting noncitizen unaccompanied children (UCs) during transport.

Our objective was to evaluate how DHS determined employee status for placement into vaccine distribution priority groups; determine how DHS, in conjunction with VHA, planned to triage and distribute available vaccine inventory and vaccinate frontline, mission-critical DHS staff; and evaluate how DHS executed its plan.

We are issuing this management alert to advise the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that its Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Funeral Assistance Program operating procedures contradict FEMA’s previous interpretation of long-standing regulations for ineligible funeral expenses established in FEMA’s Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG). This interpretation of regulations for ineligible funeral expenses remains unchanged in FEMA Policy 104-21-0001 (COVID-19-specific policy).

ICE did not adequately justify the need for the sole source contract to house migrant families and spent approximately $17 million for hotel space and services at six hotels that went largely unused between April and June 2021.

The objective is to determine to what extent FEMA ensured states and territories distributed supplemental state lost wages assistance (LWA) from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to eligible recipients.

The objective of this review was to determine whether DHS effectively supported operable and interoperable emergency communications for Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government officials and critical infrastructure operators during the Coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic.

The objective was to determine whether Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC), in Ocilla, Georgia provided Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees adequate medical care and adhered to COVID-19 protections.

The objective was to determine to what extent FEMA followed Federal and departmental procedures and guidelines for awarding COVID-19 contracts to vendors in unusual and urgent circumstances.

The objective was to determine the effectiveness of USCIS’ technology systems to provide timely and accurate electronic processing of immigration and naturalization benefit requests while field offices, asylum offices, and application support centers were closed or operating on a reduced workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Before reopening in June 2020, FLETC developed a formal plan to resume in-person training. Through this plan, along with other policies and procedures, FLETC established protocols in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance and medical expertise. DHS students and component officials we spoke with confirmed that these protocols were in place and told us that, overall, they were effective.

The objective was to determine how effectively FEMA supported and coordinated Federal efforts to distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. We determined that FEMA did not have reliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure accurate adjudication of resource requests, it did not have a process to allocate the limited supply of PPE, and FEMA’s strategic documents did not clearly outline roles and responsibilities to lead the Federal response. We made three recommendations that FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC, formally...

The objective of this review was to determine to what extent the Department of Homeland Security has implemented COVID-19 measures for migrants at the southwest border. We reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody and is not required to do so. Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic individuals. According to CBP officials, as a frontline law enforcement agency, it does not have the necessary resources to conduct such testing. For migrants that are transferred or released from CBP...

During our unannounced inspection of Otay Mesa in San Diego, California, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that compromised the health, safety, and rights of detainees. Otay Mesa complied with standards for classification and generally provided sufficient medical care to detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Otay Mesa did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing. Overall, we found that Otay Mesa did not meet standards for grievances, segregation, or staff-detainee communications. Specifically, Otay Mesa did not respond timely...

ICE has taken various actions to prevent the pandemic’s spread among detainees and staff at their detention facilities. At the nine facilities we remotely inspected, these measures included maintaining adequate supplies of PPE such as face masks, enhanced cleaning, and proper screening for new detainees and staff. However, we found other areas in which detention facilities struggled to properly manage the health and safety of detainees. For example, we observed instances where staff and detainees did not consistently wear face masks or socially distance. In addition, we noted that some...

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) needs better oversight and policy to adequately safeguard migrants experiencing medical emergencies or illnesses along the southwest border. CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations, which when implemented, should improve medical attention and procedures for migrants at the southwest border

During our unannounced inspection of Adams in Natchez, Mississippi, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. We made seven recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the New Orleans ERO Field Office overseeing Adams addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all seven recommendations.

During our unannounced inspection of Pulaski County Jail, we identified violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Pulaski did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing, which may have contributed to repeated COVID-19 transmissions at the facility. Pulaski did not meet standards for classification, medical care, segregation, or detainee communication. We found that the facility was not providing a color-coded visual...

We identified violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. La Palma Correctional Center (LPCC) complied with the ICE detention standard regarding classification. However, detainee reports and grievances allege an environment of mistreatment and verbal abuse, including in response to peaceful detainee protests of the facility’s handling of the pandemic. In addressing the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), LPCC did not enforce ICE’s precautions including facial coverings and social distancing...

DHS OIG issued a series of three reports between August 2014 and October 2016 examining DHS’ pandemic activities, including 28 recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS planning and response activities. We conducted this verification review to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of DHS’ corrective actions. We focused our review on 11 of 28 key recommendations that dealt with DHS-wide pandemic planning and response activities. We determined that DHS provided the OIG with adequate documentation of its initial plans and actions to address the recommendations to...

This audit will look at the quality of data reported in selected President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs to determine if weaknesses exist that may lead to inaccurate results reporting. The objectives of this audit are to assess the extent to which USAID has: (1) designed and implemented internal controls over collecting, verifying, and reporting PEPFAR data; and (2) identified and mitigated the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on its internal controls over PEPFAR data quality.  

o We surveyed staff at Border Patrol stations and OFO ports of entry from April 22, 2020 to May 1, 2020. The 136 Border Patrol stations and 307 OFO ports of entry that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among travelers, detained individuals, and staff. These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and having personal protective equipment for staff, as well as supplies available to those individuals with whom they come into contact. However, facilities reported concerns with their inability...

As required by section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Inspectors General for the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID work together to report quarterly to Congress on every overseas contingency operation’s progress and corresponding oversight activities.  Starting in the second quarter of fiscal year 2020, these quarterly reports include reporting on the COVID-19 outbreaks in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as the U.S. government response to them.

We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff. The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees. These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure. However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social...

USAID’s branding and marking efforts enhance the visibility and value of U.S. foreign assistance and are intended to inform beneficiaries that aid comes from the American people. Unfortunately, according to the Agency, beneficiaries of the billions of dollars of foreign assistance provided by the United States every year often have little to no awareness that the aid they receive is provided by the American people.  The objectives of this audit are to determine the extent to which USAID: (1) has policies and procedures to ensure compliance with statutory branding and marking requirements and (2) provided information and oversight to ensure implementers complied with branding and marking requirements. Given particular interest from Congress amid the ongoing pandemic, this audit will consider the impact of COVID-19 under both objectives as appropriate.

The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy (OGAC) has established a goal of 70 percent local partner participation in President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs by 2020. Included in the definition of local partner participation is government-to-government assistance, which is especially risky in Africa given the levels of political corruption in countries with the greatest HIV prevalence. The objectives of this audit are to: (1) describe the extent to which USAID’s PEPFAR budgets are on track to meet the goal for local partner funding; (2) assess to what extent USAID’s agency-wide strategy has prepared the agency to increase PEPFAR funding to local partners while addressing risks; and (3) assess to what extent selected USAID missions in Africa followed agency guidance designed to achieve the goal for PEPFAR local partner funding while addressing risks.  The audit also explores topics related to the possible effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on USAID’s ability to reach the OGAC target and the extent to which USAID has identified financial and programmatic risks emanating from the pandemic.