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- Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (13)
State/Local Agency
State (State and Local Reports)
Fraud Type
Agency Reviewed
Related Organizations
Management Challenges
Any Recommendations
Any Open Recommendations
Reports
American Rescue Plan Act: Review of the Reconciliation of the Child Tax Credit
Review all of the 6,833 taxpayers with excess Child Tax Credit identified during our review and take appropriate actions to ensure that the taxpayers receive the correct amount of the Child Tax Credit.
Identify additional taxpayers after May 5, 2022, who received excess Child Tax Credit as a result of tax examiner error and take appropriate actions to ensure that these taxpayers receive the correct amount of the Child Tax Credit.
Review the 105 taxpayers who potentially did not receive all of their eligible Child Tax Credit identified during our review and take appropriate actions to ensure that they receive the correct amount of the Child Tax Credit.
Evaluate the priority of programming to ensure that processes and procedures are developed to identify and correct tax examiner entries input during the error correction process that exceed statutory limits, including a process to systemically reprocess corrected returns through Error Resolution programming before being released for processing.
On February 17, 2022, we notified IRS management of our concerns with undeliverable payments that post after the processing of the tax return. In these instances, the IRS processed the tax return as if the payment was received by the taxpayer. As a result, the taxpayer would receive less Child Tax Credit than they are eligible to receive. We recommended that the IRS develop a process to identify undeliverable payments after
processing of the TY 2021 tax return.
Identify taxpayers with advance payments who have yet to file a TY 2021 tax return and send a reminder notice, similar to the Department of the Treasury, using the advance payments as part of the criteria.
Work with the Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, to create a process to recover potentially erroneous advance payments from taxpayers who have not filed a TY 2021 tax return.
American Rescue Plan Act: Continued Review of Premium Tax Credit Provisions
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, and the Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should consider expanding the use of soft notices to address potentially erroneous PTC claims. These notices should provide individuals with information specific to the eligibility or reporting requirements related to the potential error the IRS identified and suggest the filing of an amended return, if an error has
occurred.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should notify the 317,418 taxpayers we identified, who potentially received less PTC than they were entitled or repaid more APTC than required, that they may qualify for additional PTC or overpaid APTC and encourage them to file an amended Tax Year 2021 return, if applicable.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should notify the 317,418 taxpayers we identified, who potentially received less PTC than they were entitled or repaid more APTC than required, that they may qualify for additional PTC or overpaid APTC and encourage them to file an amended Tax Year 2021 return, if applicable.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop processes, such as the use of courtesy letters to notify individuals of their potential eligibility, to proactively assist taxpayers who, based on available tax return and Exchange data, potentially claimed less PTC than entitled or paid more APTC than required.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop processes, such as the use of courtesy letters to notify individuals of their potential eligibility, to proactively assist taxpayers who, based on available tax return and Exchange data, potentially claimed less PTC than entitled or paid more APTC than required.
On October 26, 2022, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, of our concerns regarding taxpayers who are potentially eligible for additional PTC based on their unemployment status during Tax Year 2021. We recommended that the Director, Submission Processing, notify these taxpayers that they may qualify for additional PTC or be able to reduce the amount of excess APTC they must repay and encourage them to file an amended Tax Year 2021 return, if they qualify.
On October 25, 2022, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, of our concerns with the draft Tax Year 2022 Form 8962 instructions. We
recommended that the IRS revise the instructions to inform taxpayers that they have an option to set a domestic violence indicator on their tax return.
Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Protect DoD Information When Using Collaboration Tools During the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Pandemic
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
(U) Rec. B.1.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service renegotiate changes with the Adobe Connect vendor to configure Adobe Connect to require privileged users to authenticate into the collaboration tool using multifactor authentication.
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Recommendation is CUI
Rec. B.3.c: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency configure Zoom for Government to lock user accounts after three unsuccessful logon attempts in a 15-minute period.
Recommendation is CUI
Recurring Identification Is Needed to Ensure That Employers Full Pay the Deferred Social Security Tax
The Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should ensure that the 3,231 tax accounts are updated to reflect the correct balance due.
The Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should continue to identify new tax accounts with a Social Security tax deferral at least through Calendar Year 2024 to ensure that all unpaid deferrals are identified for collection as appropriate.
Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Accounts Management Function Inventories to Below Pre‑Pandemic Levels
Ensure that all sites understand and begin immediately stamping the ICT received date after correspondence screening is completed, and that individual and business documents are screened with equal importance.
Coordinate with the Information Technology organization to explore adding Taxpayer Relations inventories into the CII, so that all Accounts Management inventory is located in the same inventory management system.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should establish time frames for and a process to measure correspondence screening timeliness at each site.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should rescind the requirement that only the TEs and the CSRs perform correspondence
screening and encourage all sites to use mail clerks, after providing them with adequate training.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure prompt completion of the ICT review to determine if additional scanners will be
purchased.
Discontinue correspondence screening via telework and ensure at all sites that screening must be conducted in the same IRS facility where documents are being scanned by the ICT.
Identify and address the cause of Accounts Management function employees incorrectly routing cases to other IRS functions and work with other IRS functions to update their Internal Revenue Manuals to make it clear that incorrectly routed documents should be returned to the
originating employee.
We recommended that management take steps to hire as many mail clerks as possible.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should establish goals for each of the Accounts Management function’s inventory types and develop a plan for addressing those goals to ensure a timely return to pre-pandemic inventory levels.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment, should prioritize funding and implementation of automated processing of Forms 1040-X to increase efficiencies and reduce taxpayer burden.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should implement temporary solutions for the processing of Forms 1040-X to reduce the backlogs, reduce taxpayer burden, and save IRS resources until an automated solution is implemented.
Coordinate with the Information Technology organization to prevent generating transcripts for manual refunds less than $100 and adjust the frequency that some transcripts are generated to help management get through the inventory more efficiently.
Temporarily relieve employees in the Accounts Management function from having to complete paperwork for barred statutes, so they can focus on eliminating the backlogged inventory and prevent future barred statutes.
Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Implement Cybersecurity Protections Over Remote Access Software in the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Telework Environment
Rec. A.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the U.S. Southern Command - Joint Interagency Task Force South Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber and Intelligence direct its network administrators to scan the VMware Horizon main virtual desktop for malware in accordance with the McAfee Endpoint Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not scanning the main virtual desktop.
Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Naval Surface Warfare Center - Panama City Division direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.4.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.4.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.5.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers revise the organization's policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.5.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.6: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. B.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to revise the vulnerability management program to include mitigation timeframes for all vulnerabilities and develop plans of actions and milestones for all vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated in a timely manner.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs Great Plains Region Did Not Oversee CARES Act Funds Appropriately
We recommend that the BIA Great Plains Region develop and implement a process to acquire the delinquent CARES Act Federal Financial Reports and Annual Narrative Reports identified in the Attachment of this management advisory.
We recommend that the BIA Great Plains Region develop a process to identify and address any other delinquent CARES Act Federal Financial Reports and Annual Narrative Reports.
We recommend that the BIA Great Plains Region develop and implement written policies and procedures that describe the roles and responsibilities of BIA officials and the review processes for Federal Financial Reports and Annual Narrative Reports to ensure submitted reports are complete, accurate, and address areas of concern.
We recommend that the BIA Great Plains Region in accordance with developed and implemented written policies and procedures, provide and track annual training for BIA officials responsible for reviewing Federal Financial Reports and Annual Narrative Reports.
The Omaha Tribe Did Not Account for CARES Act Funds Appropriately
We recommend that the BIA resolve the unreasonable hazard pay costs of $29,574 by requiring the Omaha Tribe to perform an analysis of the costs incurred to applicable criteria and document its determination of reasonableness.
We recommend that the BIA resolve the questioned hazard pay costs of $27,841 for Payment 1 by requiring the Omaha Tribe to provide detailed reconciliation of incurred costs to supporting documentation.
We recommend that the BIA resolve the questioned costs of $182,388 for Payment 2 by requiring the Omaha Tribe to provide detailed complete supporting documentation for the hazard pay and indirect costs.
We recommend that the BIA review the Omaha Tribe’s revised policy regarding the custody of checks and document that proper controls have been implemented.
We recommend that the BIA resolve the questioned costs of $42,067 by requiring the Omaha Tribe to provide a detailed list of the questioned transactions and voided checks to the BIA for its files to ensure these transactions are not claimed for reimbursement.
We recommend that the BIA resolve the questioned costs of $10,792 by requiring the Omaha Tribe to reallocate these costs to the appropriate funding source.
We recommend that the BIA require the Omaha Tribe to revise its policy to ensure a complete property record for CARES Act-funded assets in accordance with 2 C.F.R. § 200.313(d)(1).
Backlogs of Tax Returns and Other Account Work Will Continue Into the 2023 Filing Season
The Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education Have the Opportunity To Implement Additional Controls To Prevent or Detect Multi-dipping of Pandemic Response Funds
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education develop and implement policies, procedures, or guidance designed to prevent or detect <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education communicate the policies and procedures developed and train bureau personnel and Tribes on preventing and detecting <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education develop and implement policies, procedures, or guidance designed to prevent or detect <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education develop and implement policies, procedures, or guidance designed to prevent or detect <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education develop and implement policies, procedures, or guidance designed to prevent or detect <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education communicate the policies and procedures developed and train bureau personnel and Tribes on preventing and detecting <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education communicate the policies and procedures developed and train bureau personnel and Tribes on preventing and detecting <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.
We recommend that the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education communicate the policies and procedures developed and train bureau personnel and Tribes on preventing and detecting <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
multi-dipping
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
When a recipient receives money from multiple federal sources and uses it for the same purpose, this could be an indication of multi-dipping.
</span>
</span>
.