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Read our report on six communities’ experiences with pandemic funding and programs, which provides valuable lessons learned to improve federal emergency response programs.

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Search reports, investigative results, and agency plansShowing 61 - 70 of 112 results
Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG

Fraud Risk Inventory for the CDBG and ESG CARES Act Funds

We conducted this engagement in coordination with the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) to gain an understanding of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) fraud risk management practices and develop an inventory of fraud risks that HUD had not already identified for the funds appropriated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG) programs. We identified five overall risk factors that contribute to the risk of fraud for the CDBG and ESG CARES Act...
Department of Homeland Security OIG

FLETC’s Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at Its Glynco Training Center

Before reopening in June 2020, FLETC developed a formal plan to resume in-person training. Through this plan, along with other policies and procedures, FLETC established protocols in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance and medical expertise. DHS students and component officials we spoke with confirmed that these protocols were in place and told us that, overall, they were effective.
Department of Homeland Security OIG

Lessons Learned from FEMA’s Initial Response to COVID-19

The objective was to determine how effectively FEMA supported and coordinated Federal efforts to distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. We determined that FEMA did not have reliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure accurate adjudication of resource requests, it did not have a process to allocate the limited supply of PPE, and FEMA’s strategic documents did not clearly outline roles and responsibilities to lead the Federal response. We made three recommendations that FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC, formally...
Department of Homeland Security OIG

DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border

The objective of this review was to determine to what extent the Department of Homeland Security has implemented COVID-19 measures for migrants at the southwest border. We reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody and is not required to do so. Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic individuals. According to CBP officials, as a frontline law enforcement agency, it does not have the necessary resources to conduct such testing. For migrants that are transferred or released from CBP...
Department of Homeland Security OIG

Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Otay Mesa Detention Center

During our unannounced inspection of Otay Mesa in San Diego, California, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that compromised the health, safety, and rights of detainees. Otay Mesa complied with standards for classification and generally provided sufficient medical care to detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Otay Mesa did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing. Overall, we found that Otay Mesa did not meet standards for grievances, segregation, or staff-detainee communications. Specifically, Otay Mesa did not respond timely...
Department of Homeland Security OIG

ICE’s Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses

ICE has taken various actions to prevent the pandemic’s spread among detainees and staff at their detention facilities. At the nine facilities we remotely inspected, these measures included maintaining adequate supplies of PPE such as face masks, enhanced cleaning, and proper screening for new detainees and staff. However, we found other areas in which detention facilities struggled to properly manage the health and safety of detainees. For example, we observed instances where staff and detainees did not consistently wear face masks or socially distance. In addition, we noted that some...
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee

Lessons Learned in Oversight of Pandemic Relief Funds

The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) supports independent oversight of $5 trillion worth of relief funds provided by Congress to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. This is an unprecedented amount of money, and it was disbursed quickly. The PRAC has worked with dozens of Inspectors General across the federal government to examine whether it was spent correctly and reached those it was intended to help. Together, we have issued more than 275 oversight reports that reveal common challenges facing agencies across major relief programs like unemployment insurance and loans to...
Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG

COVID-19 Forbearance Data in HUD’s Single Family Default Monitoring System Generally Agreed With Information Maintained by Loan Servicers

We audited lender reporting of COVID-19 forbearances for Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured loans in the Single Family Default Monitoring System (SFDMS). We compared default reporting data from SFDMS to loan data provided by five sampled servicing lenders that serviced a third of the FHA single-family portfolio. Our audit objective was to determine whether COVID-19 forbearance data available in SFDMS were consistent with the information maintained by loan servicers. We found that COVID-19 forbearance data available in SFDMS were generally consistent with the information maintained by...
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee

Observations: Fiscal Year 2020 COVID-19 Federal Contracting

The PRAC’s objective was to review pandemic-related federal contracts and identify first-time contractors and contracts awarded without competitive bidding. We found that first-time federal contractors received $4.4 billion worth of pandemic contracts in Fiscal Year 2020 and that $128 million was deobligated from contracts with first-time federal contractors during the same period. Additionally, we identified the four most common flexibilities identified to justify limited competition were urgency, only one source, simplified acquisition procedures, and authorized by statute. Of these, we...