Reports
Audit of the State of Florida's Administration of the Emergency Assistance to Non-Public Schools (EANS) Grant
The purpose of the audit is to determine whether the Florida Department of Education designed and implemented (1) application processes that adequately assessed nonpublic schools' eligibility for EANS funded services or assistance and complied with other applicable requirements and (2) oversight processes to ensure that EANS funded services or assistance were used for allowable purposes.
Compilation of Lessons Learned Report
The objective of the report is to compile SIGPR's audit products as well as lessons learned related to SIGPR's budget, jurisdiction, and hiring authority.
Audit of Risk Factor Mitigation in MSLP Loans
The objective of this review is to develop other MSLP audit ideas derived from our data analytics platform and risk assessment.
Independent Review of Direct Loan Recipient: Map Large Inc.
The objective of the audit is to determine if Map Large follows the terms and conditions of its direct loan agreement.
Audit of the Effects the MSLP’s Loan Losses Have on Treasury’s Investment
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston manages the Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) through a Special Purpose Vehicle, which is backed by a $16.6 billion equity investment by Treasury. SIGPR will issue cyclical interim reports to Treasury on the information gathered from the various banks that participate in the MSLP.
COVID 19 – UI Claims With Deceased Persons' Social Security Numbers
In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSN) of deceased persons. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with SSNs of deceased persons identified and referred by the OIG.
COVID-19 – UI Claims with Federal Prisoners' Social Security Numbers
In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was UI claimants filing with Social Security numbers (SSNs) of federal prisoners. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI)claims filed with SSNs of federal prisoners identified and referred by the OIG.
COVID-19 – Multi-State UI Claimants
In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted the U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. Multistate claimants were the largest high-risk area. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA) the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act Unemployment Insurance (UI) claims identified and referred by the OIG.
COVID-19 – UI Claims with Suspicious Email Accounts
In September 2022, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) alerted U.S. Department of Labor to over $45 billion in potential fraud paid in four high-risk areas. One high-risk area was Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants filing with suspicious email accounts. Through Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the OIG provided states with underlying methodology as well as specific claimant information for follow-up action. This audit will examine the extent to which ETA and states have taken action to follow up on potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims filed with suspicious email accounts identified and referred by the OIG.
COVID-19 – Alert Memo Third-Party Identity Service Contractor
There have been multiple public and private reports that identity service contractors did not provide equitable access to unemployment compensation and mishandled confidential information. We will determine if Employment and Training Administration (ETA) and states provided sufficient oversight from March 27, 2000 – present over facial recognition technology used by identity service contractors.