Reports

Department of Homeland Security OIG

More than $2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees’ Identities

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls to prevent state workforce agencies (SWA) from paying more than $2.6 million in Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) for potentially fraudulent claims made by Department of Homeland Security employees, or claimants who fraudulently used the identities of DHS employees to obtain LWA benefits.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/28/2022

1 - Closed

: We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a standard risk assessment process before initiating new Federal
grant programs. This risk assessment should focus on identifying and evaluating program risks that may affect FEMA’s ability to prevent waste,
fraud, and abuse in its programs and mitigating those external risks to the extent practical.

2 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator conduct an after-action study of the Lost Wages Assistance program and update FEMA Individual Assistance programs based on the lessons learned from the study.

3 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator, when mandated to rely on eligibility determinations of non-FEMA programs, develop a process to assess the program controls and identify risk, where practical.

4 - Open

We recommend the Chief Human Capital Officer for DHS’ Management Directorate develop, implement, and communicate departmental
policies and procedures for the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees program to each component to ensure compliance with Federal requirements.

5 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to monitor whether grantees implement and use the controls attested to in FEMA-approved state administrative plans.

5 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to monitor whether grantees implement and use the
controls attested to in FEMA-approved state administrative plans.

6 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to review state administrative plans for consistency and
ensure they include fraud prevention and mitigation strategies.

7 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator de-obligate and recover any monies determined to have been obtained fraudulently or other
improper payments through the Lost Wages Assistance program from the state workforce agencies.

Department of the Treasury OIG

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - XOJET Aviation, LLC (Redacted)

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/28/2022

Department of the Treasury OIG

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - XOJET Aviation, LLC

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of the Treasury OIG

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - Alpine Aviation, Inc. (Redacted)

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of the Treasury OIG

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc. (Redacted)

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/28/2022

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Homeland Security OIG

FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not implement controls that may have prevented the 21 state workforce agencies (SWA) in our review from distributing more than $3.7 billion in improper payments through its Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/22/2022

1 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a standard risk assessment process before initiating new Federal grant programs. This risk assessment should focus on identifying and evaluating program risks that may affect FEMA’s ability to prevent waste,
fraud, and abuse in its programs and mitigating those external risks to the extent practical.

2 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator, when mandated to rely on eligibility determinations of non-FEMA programs, develop a process to assess the program controls and identify risk to the extent practical.

3 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator update the State Administrative Plan template to incorporate a requirement for grantees to include a description of the steps to prevent improper payments.

4 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to monitor whether grantees implement and use the controls attested in FEMA-approved State Administrative Plans.

5 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator work with state workforce agencies to evaluate the Lost Wages Assistance program payments
and verify that all recipients who received payment have a self-certification on file, as required; to determine whether the claimant meets eligibility requirements if no self-certification is on file; and, if not, to recover the payment.

6 - Open

We recommend the FEMA Administrator conduct an after-action study of the Lost Wages Assistance program and update FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program based on the lessons learned from the study.

7 - Closed

We recommend the FEMA Administrator de-obligate and recover any monies determined to have been obtained fraudulently or other improper payments through Lost Wages Assistance from the state workforce agencies.

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/21/2022

1 - Closed

As detailed previously, we provided the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, with notifications and files detailing erroneous payments we identified and recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why the payments were made to prevent additional periodic payments to ineligible taxpayers. In addition, we recommended that the IRS add a stop payment
transaction code to taxpayer accounts to prevent them from receiving additional improper advance Child Tax Credit payments.

2 - Closed

On August 9, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns related to
eligible taxpayers who did not receive their advance Child Tax Credit payments. We recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why periodic payments were not made to eligible taxpayers.

3 - Closed

On June 29, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that the messaging provided on the IRS’s eligibility assistant tool and the presentation of information related to the advance Child Tax Credit payments on IRS.gov may be confusing to taxpayers. For example, the link to “Get Answers on the Advance Child Tax Credit” that is located on the IRS.gov main page takes taxpayers to the Advance Child Tax Credit Payments in 2021 web page; however, the links to get the questions and answers is at the bottom of the screen. We recommended that the IRS consider revising the messaging and presentation of information on its platforms to make it clear for taxpayers.

4 - Closed

On January 28, 2022, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that we identified 2.2 million taxpayers who had their direct deposit information updated by the IRS between August 23 and October 5, 2021. We recommended that the IRS conduct an outreach effort to inform taxpayers of the possibility that their advance payments may have been sent to payroll allotment accounts. This outreach effort could include sending a separate letter to the impacted taxpayers.

5 - Closed

The Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, should develop and implement processes and procedures to include data validation on incoming files from third-party sources prior to their use.

Department of Defense OIG

Audit of the DoD Certification Process for Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Section 4003 Loans Provided to Businesses Designated as Critical to Maintaining National Security

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/20/2022

Date Range

Report Type

Report Category

Submitting Agency

State/Local Agency

State (State and Local Reports)

Fraud Type

Agency Reviewed

Related Organizations

Management Challenges

Any Recommendations

Any Open Recommendations

Reports

More than $2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees’ Identities

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - XOJET Aviation, LLC (Redacted)

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - XOJET Aviation, LLC

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - Alpine Aviation, Inc. (Redacted)

CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications - Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc. (Redacted)

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

Audit of the DoD Certification Process for Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Section 4003 Loans Provided to Businesses Designated as Critical to Maintaining National Security

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