Reports

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Accounts Management Function Inventories to Below Pre‑Pandemic Levels

Audit | 5/10/2023

1 - Closed

Ensure that all sites understand and begin immediately stamping the ICT received date after correspondence screening is completed, and that individual and business documents are screened with equal importance.

10 - Open

Coordinate with the Information Technology organization to explore adding Taxpayer Relations inventories into the CII, so that all Accounts Management inventory is located in the same inventory management system.

11 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should establish time frames for and a process to measure correspondence screening timeliness at each site.

12 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should rescind the requirement that only the TEs and the CSRs perform correspondence
screening and encourage all sites to use mail clerks, after providing them with adequate training.

13 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure prompt completion of the ICT review to determine if additional scanners will be
purchased.

2 - Closed

Discontinue correspondence screening via telework and ensure at all sites that screening must be conducted in the same IRS facility where documents are being scanned by the ICT.

3 - Closed

Identify and address the cause of Accounts Management function employees incorrectly routing cases to other IRS functions and work with other IRS functions to update their Internal Revenue Manuals to make it clear that incorrectly routed documents should be returned to the
originating employee.

4 - Closed

We recommended that management take steps to hire as many mail clerks as possible.

5 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should establish goals for each of the Accounts Management function’s inventory types and develop a plan for addressing those goals to ensure a timely return to pre-pandemic inventory levels.

6 - Open

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment, should prioritize funding and implementation of automated processing of Forms 1040-X to increase efficiencies and reduce taxpayer burden.

7 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should implement temporary solutions for the processing of Forms 1040-X to reduce the backlogs, reduce taxpayer burden, and save IRS resources until an automated solution is implemented.

8 - Open

Coordinate with the Information Technology organization to prevent generating transcripts for manual refunds less than $100 and adjust the frequency that some transcripts are generated to help management get through the inventory more efficiently.

9 - Closed

Temporarily relieve employees in the Accounts Management function from having to complete paperwork for barred statutes, so they can focus on eliminating the backlogged inventory and prevent future barred statutes.

Department of Agriculture OIG

COVID-19—Forest Service’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic at Recreation Sites

OIG identified the prevention measures that Forest Service established for recreation sites in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Defense OIG

Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Implement Cybersecurity Protections Over Remote Access Software in the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Telework Environment

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 3/24/2023

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0001.A1 - Closed

Rec. A.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the U.S. Southern Command - Joint Interagency Task Force South Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber and Intelligence direct its network administrators to scan the VMware Horizon main virtual desktop for malware in accordance with the McAfee Endpoint Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not scanning the main virtual desktop.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0002.A2a - Open

Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0002.A2b - Open

Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0003.A3 - Closed

Rec. A.3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Naval Surface Warfare Center - Panama City Division direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0004.A4a - Closed

Rec. A.4.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0004.A4b - Closed

Rec. A.4.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0005.A5a - Closed

Rec. A.5.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers revise the organization's policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0005.A5b - Closed

Rec. A.5.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0001-0006.A6 - Closed

Rec. A.6: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.

D-2023-0057-D000CR-0002-0001.B1 - Closed

Rec. B.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to revise the vulnerability management program to include mitigation timeframes for all vulnerabilities and develop plans of actions and milestones for all vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated in a timely manner.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee

FRAUD ALERT: PRAC Identifies $5.4 Billion in Potentially Fraudulent Pandemic Loans Obtained Using Over 69,000 Questionable Social Security Numbers

The PRAC’s Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence (PACE) data scientists identified $5.4 Billion in potential identity fraud associated with over 69,000 questionable Social Security Numbers (SSNs) used on applications across disbursed loans in the Small Business Administration’s COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program and Paycheck Protection Program. Through collaborative verification methods with the Social Security Administration, we identified that these SSNs were used in connection with over 99,000 applications and warrant further scrutiny. The results of this Fraud Alert...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Backlogs of Tax Returns and Other Account Work Will Continue Into the 2023 Filing Season

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee

Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity Risks Across Selected Health Care Programs During the Pandemic

Recognizing how critical telehealth has been to the federal COVID-19 response, the PRAC Health Care Subgroup—which includes six Federal Offices of Inspectors General—worked together to provide insights on the use of telehealth and its associated program integrity risks.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Agriculture OIG

USDA Coronavirus Food Assistance Program Data Story

This data story is the second in the series from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and focuses on the USDA Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP). This product utilized data analytics, visualizations, and data storytelling methods to enhance transparency of how the CFAP 1 and CFAP 2 programs evolved over time.

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 9/21/2022

1 - Closed

As detailed previously, we provided the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, with notifications and files detailing erroneous payments we identified and recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why the payments were made to prevent additional periodic payments to ineligible taxpayers. In addition, we recommended that the IRS add a stop payment
transaction code to taxpayer accounts to prevent them from receiving additional improper advance Child Tax Credit payments.

2 - Closed

On August 9, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns related to
eligible taxpayers who did not receive their advance Child Tax Credit payments. We recommended that the IRS evaluate the discrepancies to identify why periodic payments were not made to eligible taxpayers.

3 - Closed

On June 29, 2021, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that the messaging provided on the IRS’s eligibility assistant tool and the presentation of information related to the advance Child Tax Credit payments on IRS.gov may be confusing to taxpayers. For example, the link to “Get Answers on the Advance Child Tax Credit” that is located on the IRS.gov main page takes taxpayers to the Advance Child Tax Credit Payments in 2021 web page; however, the links to get the questions and answers is at the bottom of the screen. We recommended that the IRS consider revising the messaging and presentation of information on its platforms to make it clear for taxpayers.

4 - Closed

On January 28, 2022, we notified the Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, that we identified 2.2 million taxpayers who had their direct deposit information updated by the IRS between August 23 and October 5, 2021. We recommended that the IRS conduct an outreach effort to inform taxpayers of the possibility that their advance payments may have been sent to payroll allotment accounts. This outreach effort could include sending a separate letter to the impacted taxpayers.

5 - Closed

The Director, Return Integrity and Compliance Services, Wage and Investment Division, should develop and implement processes and procedures to include data validation on incoming files from third-party sources prior to their use.

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Management Challenges

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Reports

Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Accounts Management Function Inventories to Below Pre‑Pandemic Levels

COVID-19—Forest Service’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic at Recreation Sites

Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Implement Cybersecurity Protections Over Remote Access Software in the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Telework Environment

FRAUD ALERT: PRAC Identifies $5.4 Billion in Potentially Fraudulent Pandemic Loans Obtained Using Over 69,000 Questionable Social Security Numbers

Backlogs of Tax Returns and Other Account Work Will Continue Into the 2023 Filing Season

Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity Risks Across Selected Health Care Programs During the Pandemic

USDA Coronavirus Food Assistance Program Data Story

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response Funding Could Be Enhanced

American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments

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