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- (-) Department of Agriculture OIG (2)
- (-) Department of Defense OIG (8)
- (-) Department of Justice OIG (6)
- (-) Department of Labor OIG (27)
- Department of Commerce OIG (1)
- Department of Education OIG (10)
- Department of Health & Human Services OIG (27)
- Department of Homeland Security OIG (17)
- Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG (1)
- Department of the Interior OIG (6)
- Department of the Treasury OIG (29)
- Department of Transportation OIG (5)
- Department of Veterans Affairs OIG (17)
- Election Assistance Commission OIG (5)
- Environmental Protection Agency OIG (5)
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG (1)
- General Services Administration OIG (1)
- National Science Foundation OIG (1)
- National Security Agency OIG (1)
- Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (1)
- Railroad Retirement Board OIG (5)
- Small Business Administration OIG (29)
- Social Security Administration OIG (3)
- Tennessee Valley Authority OIG (1)
- Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (10)
- U.S. Agency for International Development OIG (4)
- U.S. Postal Service OIG (9)
State/Local Agency
State (State and Local Reports)
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Management Challenges
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Reports
ETA Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Emergency Administrative Grants
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training specify within its policy the information states must include in their documentation to support compliance with the requirements to receive grant funds prior to disbursement of the funds.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training propose to the Office of Management and Budget an amendment to the annually updated Compliance Supplement for single audits to also disclose if states used the emergency administrative grant funds in accordance with applicable requirements in the single audit report.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training remedy the $136,353,567.50 in questioned costs.
Audit of the Reliability of the DoD Coronavirus Disease–2019 Patient Health Data
Rec. 1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency work with the Program Executive Officer of the Program Executive Office, Defense Healthcare Management Systems to document and implement the process for identifying and collecting patient health data of DoD patients in the Military Health System in current and future registries within their purview in a written document, such as a standard operating procedure. The procedure should identify, at a minimum, the internal controls throughout the process, the relevant data sources, data fields, and diagnostic codes used in the computer scripts, and should be reviewed and approved when updates occur.
Rec. 2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity and the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Joint Trauma System contracting officer's representative to revise the quality assurance surveillance plan. The plan should include an appropriate sampling methodology for selecting patient health records from the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry to verify that the contractor is achieving the contract-required accuracy rate for entering patient data, and submit the revised quality assurance surveillance plan to the contracting officer.
Rec. 2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity and the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Joint Trauma System contracting officer's representative to revise the quality assurance surveillance plan. The plan should include an appropriate sampling methodology for selecting patient health records from the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry to verify that the contractor is achieving the contract-required accuracy rate for entering patient data, and submit the revised quality assurance surveillance plan to the contracting officer.
Rec. 3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System conduct an analysis to determine whether the patient data entered into the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry met the 90 percent accuracy rate requirement for contract W81XWH-20-P-0197 and contract W81XWH-22-C-0151.
Rec. 3.a: If the contractor did not meet the 90 percent accuracy requirement, the DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity to update the contractor's rating in the contractor's performance assessment reports for contract W81XWH-22-C-0151 and contract W81XWH-20-P-0197, when feasible.
Rec. 3.b: If the contractor did not meet the 90 percent accuracy requirement, the DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity to recoup any of the $3.9 million in questioned costs paid for services that did not comply with the terms of contract W81XWH-20-P-0197, if feasible.
Rec. 3.c: If the contractor did not meet the 90 percent accuracy requirement, the DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity to recoup any of the $2.3 million in questioned costs paid for services that did not comply with the terms of contract W81XWH-22-C-0151.
Rec. 3.d: If the contractor did not meet the 90 percent accuracy requirement, the DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity to consider all available contract remedies for contract W81XWH-22-C-0151, including modifying and, if necessary, terminating and re-competing the contract, and take action to ensure that the Department receives full value for the funds it expends for contract W81XWH-22-C-0151.
Rec. 3.e: If the contractor did not meet the 90 percent accuracy requirement, the DoD OIG recommended that the Chief of the Joint Trauma System work with the Senior Contracting Official of the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity to delegate an official to review the concerns identified in this report, including the actions of the contracting officials, and take administrative actions, as necessary. The review should include a determination on whether the contractor's performance assessment reports were accurate and make updates as necessary.
Rec. 4.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency work with the Chief of the Joint Trauma System establish and implement a process for selecting Coronavirus Disease-2019 events for entry into the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry to limit selection bias.
Rec. 4.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency work with the Chief of the Joint Trauma System to include a bias disclosure notice on all reports generated from the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry until the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Registry data represent the population of DoD patients who had a Coronavirus Disease-2019 event.
Rec. 5.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) establish and implement a policy for developing and populating patient registries that aligns with the Department of Health and Human Services best practices, "Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Registries for Evaluating Patient Outcomes: A User?s Guide," current edition.
Rec. 5.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) conduct a review of all patient registries in the Military Health System to verify the reliability of data in each registry and implement corrective actions, as necessary.
Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Implement Cybersecurity Protections Over Remote Access Software in the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Telework Environment
Rec. A.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the U.S. Southern Command - Joint Interagency Task Force South Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber and Intelligence direct its network administrators to scan the VMware Horizon main virtual desktop for malware in accordance with the McAfee Endpoint Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not scanning the main virtual desktop.
Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Naval Surface Warfare Center - Panama City Division direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.4.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.4.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.5.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers revise the organization's policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.5.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.6: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. B.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to revise the vulnerability management program to include mitigation timeframes for all vulnerabilities and develop plans of actions and milestones for all vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated in a timely manner.
Capstone Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic
Conduct a thorough assessment of single-celling policies and processes, including those applicable to inmates housed in quarantine and medical isolation units and to inmates vulnerable to suicide.
Assess how to improve staff and inmate compliance with healthcare protective equipment measures at its facilities and issue clear guidance to facilities about the importance of compliance.
Ensure that actions, including any policy revisions, the BOP takes to close the two open recommendations from our 2017 restrictive housing report that reference single-celling also apply to single-celling during quarantine and medical isolation.
Explore options for permanent changes to facility infrastructures that would allow for better implementation of social distancing and other infection control measures.
Immediately update guidance regarding (1) when staff should notify the families of inmates who become seriously ill or die, including a specific timeframe, and (2) uniform criteria for what constitutes a serious illness.
Ensure that inmate family information, or the inmate emergency contact form, is updated according to policy and readily available for BOP staff who need to notify next of kin in cases of inmate serious illness or death.
COVID-19: OSHA's Enforcement Activities Did Not Sufficiently Protect Workers From Pandemic Health Hazards
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health: provide additional training to CSHOs to enforce the recording and reporting standard for fatalities.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health: update guidance or policy to include supervisory review of inspection files to ensure they contain adequate support for the reasons regarding citation issuance decisions before closing inspections.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health: develop a plan for a future pandemic or epidemic to collaborate with external agencies on worksite case data and to use this data to maximize rapid response and enforcement actions in worksites.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health: as part of OSHA's rulemaking on infectious diseases, require employers to notify all employees of all known positive cases at the worksite.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health: develop and implement a tracking tool to ensure OSHA receives and reviews all items CSHOs request during inspections to ensure alleged hazards have been mitigated.
COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training: Use data collected from monitoring and BAM reports to identify the areas of highest improper payments including fraud and create a plan to prevent similar issues in future temporary UI benefit programs.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training: Require states to have written policies and procedures, which apply lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, to continue eligibility testing and BPC procedures during emergencies or other times of increased claims volume. These policies and procedures should include strategies to pay claimants timely.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training: Work with NASWA to update the IDH Participant Agreement to require state to submit the results of their UI fraud investigations.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training: Work with NASWA to ensure the IDH cross matches are effective at preventing the types of fraud that were detected during the pandemic and regularly update using the results of state fraud investigations.
We recommend the Acting Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training: Work with the OIG and states to recover the greatest practicable amount of the $7,092,604 paid to claimants connected to likely fraudulent claims.
Audit of the Management and Coordination of Pandemic-Related Fraud Allegations and Referrals Between the Criminal Division and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion
We recommend the Assistant Secretary of Employment and Training: Implement immediate measures to ensure SWAs are required to provide ongoing access to the OIG by amending its current guidance to require disclosures to the OIG for audits and investigations as necessary, mandatory, and without time limitation for the proper oversight of the UI program.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary of Employment and Training: Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) to make ongoing disclosures of UI information to DOL OIG mandatory by expressly adding the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General (including its agents and contractors) to the list of required disclosures that are necessary for the proper oversight of the UI program without distinction as to purpose (e.g., audits versus investigations).
We recommend the Assistant Secretary of Employment and Training: Expedite 603.5(i) to expressly make disclosures of UI information to federal officials for oversight, audits, and investigations of federal programs mandatory.
Evaluation of Department of Defense Military Medical Treatment Facility Challenges During the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic in Fiscal Year 2021
Rec. A.1.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, establish a working group to address the staffing challenges identified by Military Medical Treatment Facilities during this evaluation. The working group should establish milestones to streamline the hiring process to allow Military Medical Treatment Facilities to more quickly fill civilian staffing positions.
Rec. A.1.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, establish a working group to address the staffing challenges identified by Military Medical Treatment Facilities during this evaluation. The working group should establish milestones to determine if salaries for Military Medical Treatment Facility civilian nurses are commensurate with each facility's local market and if military treatment facilities are able to hire nurses at those salaries. For locations where military treatment facility salaries are not commensurate with the local market, take appropriate actions that will reduce the disparity in those markets.
Rec. A.1.c: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, establish a working group to address the staffing challenges identified by Military Medical Treatment Facilities during this evaluation. The working group should establish milestones to establish a central authority with the knowledge of the Services' requests for individual and large group deployments of medical staff coming out of Military Medical Treatment Facilities and the associated risks to health care delivery.
Rec. A.1.d: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, establish a working group to address the staffing challenges identified by Military Medical Treatment Facilities during this evaluation. The working group should establish milestones to assess the ability of Military Medical Treatment Facilities to rapidly receive augmentation of medical staff from the Reserve Components.
Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments establish the manpower requirements for the coronavirus disease-2019 mission within the Military Medical Treatment Facilities for the staff required to support testing, vaccinations, contact tracing, and acute respiratory clinics.
Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Health Agency, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments identify the medical personnel requirements within the Military Medical Treatment Facilities, including clinicians, nurses, and support staff, needed for future long-term pandemic response and biological incidents.
Rec. B: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) develop DoD policy for the maximum consecutive hours to be worked, maximum shifts per week, and coverage of duties when absent, for Military Health System staff (at minimum, active duty military and civilian physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, and lab technicians) working in Military Medical Treatment Facilities to reduce the physical impacts leading to fatigue and burnout, and develop the appropriate waivers of this policy for Military Health System staff.
Rec. C: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) direct a new or existing working group to develop a plan to implement the recommendations in the Military Health System COVID-19 After Action Report and to develop and monitor milestones for each recommendation.
COVID-19: To Protect Mission Critical Workers, OSHA Could Leverage Inspection Collaboration Opportunities with External Federal Agencies
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health develop an OSHA outreach plan to be activated during a large-scale safety and health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic that (a) identifies external federal agencies with enforcement or oversight personnel who are active on worksites and (b) defines how OSHA will collaborate with those agencies. OSHA should consider incorporating into the plan: a process to identify and document highly visible, safety and health hazards for large-scale safety and health crises; a plan for how OSHA will conduct related outreach and training on those hazards and how to refer them to OSHA; and a tracking system for agency referrals and outcomes of those referrals, using that information to periodically inform the outreach plan on areas and types of guidance and training the agencies’ oversight and enforcement personnel need.
We recommend the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health explore mechanisms to enhance collaboration, such as MOUs or other written agreements using GAO’s seven key features for collaboration, and incorporate a process to utilize those mechanisms into the outreach plan.