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Reports
Audit of DoD Actions Taken to Implement Cybersecurity Protections Over Remote Access Software in the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Telework Environment
Rec. A.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the U.S. Southern Command - Joint Interagency Task Force South Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber and Intelligence direct its network administrators to scan the VMware Horizon main virtual desktop for malware in accordance with the McAfee Endpoint Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not scanning the main virtual desktop.
Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of the Air Force direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Naval Surface Warfare Center - Panama City Division direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.4.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency revise its policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.4.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief Information Officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.5.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers revise the organization's policy to align with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide requirement for disabling inactive users after no more than 35 days.
Rec. A.5.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Marine Corps Information Command, Control, Communications, and Computers direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. A.6: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to disable inactive user accounts after no more than 35 days of inactivity in accordance with the Windows 10 Security Technical Implementation Guide, develop compensating controls, or formally accept the risk of not disabling the inactive user accounts.
Rec. B.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency Joint Service Provider direct network and system administrators to revise the vulnerability management program to include mitigation timeframes for all vulnerabilities and develop plans of actions and milestones for all vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated in a timely manner.
Delays in Management Actions Contribute to the Continued Tax Processing Center Backlogs
On September 16, 2021, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, that the IRS needed to identify when to stop coding and editing9 prior year tax returns to prevent having to rework these returns (a situation that occurred during the 2020 Filing Season). For example, the IRS needed to send 822,994 business tax returns back to the Code and Edit function at the beginning of Processing
Year 2021 to be re-edited to allow for processing. This occurred because these tax returns, although edited, had not been entered into the IRS’s tax processing system by the end of Processing Year 2020. This resulted in an inefficient use of the IRS’s resources because IRS employees needed to re-edit the tax returns. We recommended that the IRS develop a plan to not only limit the number of returns that would require rework, but also any potential downtime in the Code and Edit function so that resources can be maximized for processing tax returns.
On September 29, 2021, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, of our observation that paper-filed
information returns were being sorted and batched. According to both Tax Processing Centers, a decision had not yet been made regarding if the information return documents will be processed or destroyed. As we reported in September 2021,10 the IRS faced similar decisions during Processing Year 2020 and destroyed approximately 30 million paper-filed information return documents around March 19, 2021, because the documents could no longer be processed through its systems. We recommended that the IRS determine if/when Processing Year 2021 paper-filed information return documents would be processed. As an alternative to destroying these documents, we recommended that management evaluate and consider scanning the information return documents using the Service Center Recognition Image Processing System while forgoing the data validation process.
On September 17, 2021, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns with the processing of a backlog of taxpayer address changes using a first-in/first-out method. As of August 27, 2021, the Ogden Entity function had more than 173,000 address change requests in its ending inventory. In our discussions with Ogden Entity function management, they estimated that due to the backlog of inventory, more than 50 percent of the address change requests the staff were working had already been made by other means, e.g., the filing of a tax return that automatically updates the taxpayer’s address. As such, Entity function employees were needlessly expending
resources working address change requests for which the address was already updated. We recommended that the IRS evaluate changing the order in which address changes are worked to a last-in/first-out method.
On October 21, 2021, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns related to the accuracy of
information communicated to taxpayers regarding transcript request methods. For example, our review of information posted on IRS.gov found that non-paper-based methods for requesting tax transcripts were not communicated clearly. Whereas, the Form 4506-T, Request
for Transcript of Tax Return, and Form 4506, Request for Copy of Tax Return, provide information for automated self-help service tools. We also found that the instructions on the Forms 4506 and 4506-T do not align with the website wording and could cause confusion for taxpayers. We recommended that IRS management update IRS.gov to provide clear communications on available resources. This includes updating the Forms 4506 and 4506-T tip sections to match IRS.gov language and conducting outreach to encourage individual taxpayers to obtain tax transcripts using the various automated methods.
On September 16, 2021, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns about the printing
capacity of the new electronic fax (e-fax) equipment in the Error Resolution System functional area, noting that this new equipment can only print about 20,000 to 30,000 pages/month (approximately 240,000/year) whereas, the prior equipment printed roughly 2 million documents
per year. In addition, in the three months since Ogden received this new equipment, it has burned out and needed new parts. Although Ogden ordered new multifunctional print devices, those were not to be delivered until January 2022. As a workaround, Ogden used two printers
that had a capacity of about 15,000 pages per month. We recommended that the Submission Processing function collaborate with Managed Print Services and the Information Technology organization to identify and expeditiously resolve all instances of printer capacity, break/fix, etc.
issues that are causing work stoppages in the Tax Processing Centers.
On December 17, 2021, we notified the Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, of our concern that the resources assigned to the RAIVS unit were not commensurate between the Kansas City and Ogden Tax Processing Centers. In our discussions, IRS management advised that taxpayer tax transcript requests had been previously transshipped from the Kansas City Tax Processing Center to the Austin Tax Processing Center with the last transshipment of work occurring in October 2021. On January 11, 2022, we notified the Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division, of the same concern noting that during our December 2021 walkthroughs, Kansas City management stated they have 70 full-time employees in the RAIVS/Income Verification Express Service’s unit. Whereas, Ogden management stated they have 183 full-time employees. As of December 10, 2021, the Kansas City RAIVS unit had over 751,000 unprocessed requests compared to a little more than 145,000 unprocessed requests in the Ogden RAIVS unit. We recommended that the IRS evaluate alternatives to address the volume of RAIVS inventory at the Kansas City Tax Processing Center. This should include an evaluation of the capacity to reallocate staffing at the Kansas City Tax Processing Center to assist the RAIVS unit, and/or realignment of work among the various Tax Processing Centers, i.e., transship inventory from
Kansas City to Ogden.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should immediately take steps to address the imbalance of Tax Processing Center staffing and inventory to address the continued backlog of transcript requests.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop a detailed strategy to show how current and future staffing resources, including available surge team members, will be used to address the significant backlog of amended returns in the Submission Processing function’s inventory.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment, should ensure that the various products and IRS.gov landing pages are updated to reflect acceptable methods for faxing information to the IRS.
Compliance Efforts Are Needed to Address Refund Claims Reported on Form 1139 That Are Based on the CARES Act Net Operating Loss Carryback Provisions
Track and monitor examination results for the 25 “still open” examinations of Forms 1120 with reported NOL and an associated Form 1139 reported in Figure 4 of this report, excluding Joint Committee Refund cases which currently have specific monitoring requirements in place.
Use the examination results from Recommendation 1 to assess whether to increase the number of examinations of Forms 1120 with reported NOL and an associated Form 1139.
The Commissioner, SB/SE Division should review the examination results and computations of proposed NOL adjustments for the 25 “still open” Form 1120 examinations with associated Forms 1139, as referenced in Figure 4, excluding Joint Committee Refund cases which currently have specific review requirements in place, to determine if the interim guidance regarding NOLs is being properly followed.
Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During the 2021 Filing Season
On June 15, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns with the systemic calculation of the allowable RRC amount. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child for which the IRS has already paid an EIP or an RRC to someone else and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 7,022 individuals identified in which the IRS issued multiple RRCs for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 75,594 tax returns identified in which the individual is potentially a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Perform analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional tax returns with the same characteristics as those the IRS determined were filed by a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover erroneous RRC payments.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should coordinate with the Territories to confirm and recover erroneous RRCs.
Review the nearly 6.9 million potentially eligible individuals we provided to the IRS who had not filed a Tax Year 2020 tax return as of May 27, 2021, and send a letter to those individuals who still have not filed a Tax Year 2020 return to encourage them to file a return and claim the RRC if eligible.
Review the 3.1 million eligible individuals we identified who filed a Tax Year 2020 return and proactively issue these taxpayers their credit.
Conduct additional analysis to identify tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, in which an individual is eligible for the RRC based on their Tax Year 2020 tax return and did not claim the credit, and proactively issue the taxpayer their credit.
If IRS management does not proactively issue the RRC to individuals who filed a return and did not claim the credit, the IRS should notify these individuals that they are eligible to claim the RRC and should file an amended tax return to claim the credit.
On March 19, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that an incorrect amount of advance payments was being used to calculate the RRC for some taxpayers. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.
Work with the BFS to ensure that individuals who were denied the RRC and have still not activated their EIP1 or EIP2 debit card as of December 31, 2021, have EIPs reversed in their tax account and are issued their RRC. These processes should include notifying Metabank that the debit cards in question are to be cancelled.
Work with the BFS to obtain recurring data during Processing Year 2022 to identify individuals who have not activated their advance ARPA RRC debit card at the time a return is filed and implement processes to reverse the advance payment so these individuals can receive the RRC on their Tax Year 2021 tax return.
We alerted the Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns that the IRS was unnecessarily burdening taxpayers whose RRC claims were identified for manual ERS review. We recommended the IRS develop processes to systemically adjust RRC claims using the computer-generated RRC calculation.
On April 6, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns regarding ERS tax examiners incorrectly computing the RRC (see management’s action in response to Recommendation 1). We recommended the IRS review the returns we identified and take the actions necessary to ensure that these taxpayers receive the amount of the RRC
they are entitled to receive.
On March 12, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that some tax returns were not being identified by fraud filters. We recommended IRS management review the returns we identified and associated fraud filters to identify why these returns were not selected and make programming changes as necessary to ensure proper
identification of returns with potentially questionable claims.
Conduct analysis to identify Tax Year 2020 RRC claims processed after May 27, 2021, to identify other returns in which ERS tax examiners incorrectly calculated the number of allowable dependents and returns that were not reprocessed per IRS guidance after programming was corrected, and ensure that these taxpayers receive the correct amount of the RRC.
Review the 14,508 individuals identified in which the IRS issued an RRC to an individual who was claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC and were also claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box, and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 238,680 individuals under the age of 25 identified as potential dependents and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.
Review the 15,741 individuals identified in which the individual incorrectly received an RRC and an EIP for the same qualifying child and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.
The Child Tax Credit Update Portal Was Successfully Deployed, but Security and Process Improvements Are Needed
Audit of Entitlements for Activated Army National Guard and Air National Guard Members Supporting the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Mission
Rec. 1.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, update the DoD Financial Management Regulation, volume 7A, "Military Pay Policy - Active Duty and Reserve Pay," chapter 27, "Family Separation Allowance" to clearly state that the permanent duty station of a Reserve Component member on temporary duty status is the member's primary residence for the purpose of determining Family Separation Allowance entitlement.
Rec. 1.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, update the DoD Financial Management Regulation, volume 7A, "Military Pay Policy - Active Duty and Reserve Pay," chapter 27, "Family Separation Allowance" to clarify that Family Separation Allowance entitlement determination is based on the commuting distance between the member's primary residence and their temporary duty location.
Rec. 2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement policies and procedures to require the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to complete a review of proof of residency documentation when the member's primary residency is established or changed for the Basic Allowance for Housing entitlement to ensure consistency throughout all Army National Guard and Air National Guard units and organizations within every state, territory, and the District. The policies and procedures should also include requirements that: * document a member's primary residence address; * require members to provide proof of their primary residence address; * certify the primary address of members and review supporting documentation; and * provide oversight to ensure primary residence address information is complete and accurate.
Rec. 2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement policies and procedures to outline the process and frequency of recertification for Basic Allowance for Housing entitlement that Army National Guard and Air National Guard officials will use to verify and fully document the dependency status of members to provide clarification to the DoD Financial Management Regulation, volume 7A, chapter 26. These procedures should include: * how recertifications will be completed; * which members will complete a recertification; and * how Army National Guard and Air National Guard officials will provide oversight to ensure that information is complete and accurate.
Rec. 2.c: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement policies and procedures to require Army National Guard and Air National Guard officials to review and document the status of a military member married to another military member regardless of which Military Service, Reserve or Active Component, or Army National Guard or Air National Guard unit the member's spouse belongs to, and identify which member will claim any applicable dependents.
Rec. 2.d: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement policies and procedures to specify the methods for confirming eligibility and paying Family Separation Allowance for Army National Guard and Air National Guard members, in accordance with the DoD Financial Management Regulation, volume 7A, chapter 27, and include the: * timeliness of payments; * determination of Family Separation Allowance eligibility for back to back orders; * members assigned to their normal duty locations; and * requirement to track members to know when they return to their primary residence.
Rec. 2.e: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement policies and procedures to establish formal dissemination and communication procedures for National Guard Bureau policies related to entitlements provided to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, including the policies in the preceding recommendations. The procedures should require: * creation of a central location where policies and procedures will be kept for easy access by all states, territories, and the District; and * confirmation of receipt from all of the states, territories, and the District when procedures are communicated or obtained.
Rec. 3: The DoD OIG recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard, develop and implement additional internal control procedures for the review of transactions manually submitted by the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to the payment system prior to payment to ensure the completeness and accuracy of transactions.
Program and Organizational Changes Are Needed to Address the Continued Inadequate Tax Account Assistance Provided to Taxpayers
On September 20, 2021, we notified the Director, Accounts Management, that the Austin site was not requiring Accounts Management screeners to come into the office to perform their duties, resulting in a significant backlog and delays in inventory being routed to Accounts Management to be worked. We recommended that the IRS establish consistent guidance and clarification on when resources can be directed to the office to help with screening inventory, to ensure that sufficient staff is available to screen documents in a timely manner, and establish processes to monitor the progress,
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should update existing scanning software or obtain a new scanning software to
address document capacity concerns.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure that programming is updated to systemically reject electronic
submissions of Forms 2848 and 8821 when missing one of the five essential elements (name, address, signature, etc.) without manually mailing a rejection letter.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure that the rejection letter used for Forms 2848 and 8821 is updated
to include language that a revised form can be submitted electronically via an IRS Tax Pro Account25 or through Taxpayer Digital Communication.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop an action plan to prioritize the continued expansion of documents that can be sent in via electronic fax and converted into a Correspondence Imaging System (CIS) image.
Develop an action plan to prioritize the continued expansion of documents that can be sent in via electronic fax and converted into a CIS image.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should Identify priority work that needs to be expedited by the Image Control Team (ICT) and assess the feasibility of creating an electronic fax number to receive this inventory.
On July 12, 2021, TiGTA notified the Director, Accounts Management, of concerns regarding inaccuracies as it related to the compiling and reporting of the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR). TIGTA recommended that the IRS perform a reconciliation of each Accounts Management site’s AMIR to the source reports to identify inventory inconsistencies and reporting errors by site
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should complete the inventory reconciliations for the four remaining Accounts
Management site’s to identify and correct inventory inaccuracies and inconsistencies and implement processes to provide oversight by periodically performing reconciliations for each site so that any future inconsistencies and errors are identified and corrected in a timely manner.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop specific and detailed instructions for preparing the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR), including how controlled and uncontrolled inventory should be captured
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop a process to systemically pull all controlled inventory for each
Accounts Management site for the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR) to ensure consistency, reduce human error, and
increase efficiencies
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should modify Accounts Management inventory reporting to report unassigned
controlled inventory separately on the nationwide Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR) and limit the site-specific AMIRs to only
the inventory assigned to be worked in each site.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should evaluate directing taxpayers to send tax account correspondence and
replies intended for Accounts Management directly to Campus Support Sites for processing to reduce backlogs at Tax Processing Centers and improve services to taxpayers.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should prioritize the development and implementation of tools that will enable
taxpayers seeking assistance or responding to Accounts Management to correspond with the IRS electronically, including the ability to directly upload documents into Accounts Management’s inventory.
The Chief Taxpayer Experience Officer, in conjunction with the Director, IRS NEXT Office, should evaluate establishing two distinct IRS programs as part of the IRS reorganization under the Taxpayer First Act – one dedicated to answering toll-free telephone calls and one dedicated to working Accounts Management inventory – with adequate staffing to provide appropriate service to taxpayers using each channel.
On June 9, 2021, we notified the Director, Customer Account Services, that Submission Processing requested resources from Accounts Management to assist with clearing the Image Control Team (ICT) backlog and was told by Campus Support management that no resources could be made available to assist with reducing the ICT backlog. We recommended that the IRS assess the availability of Campus Support’s ICT staffing or other resources that could be made available to assist with clearing the ICT backlogs at Tax Processing Centers.
On September 3, 2021, we notified the Director, Accounts Management, of concerns relating to the newly stood-up Fresno Campus Support Site, including scanners not being used to the full extent possible. We recommended that IRS management provide us with it plans to address our concerns identified with the new Fresno Campus Support Site, including additional staffing to assist Image Control Team (ICT).
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should complete a strategic review of all 10 Image Control Team (ICT) sites to determine what contributes to the ICT’s inability to timely scan and validate documents. Based on the results of this review, initiate steps to address the concerns identified. This should include the development of an action plan to ensure that the high-capacity ICT scanners and staffing are realigned to the appropriate sites based on actual or expected inventory levels and that responsibility of the ICT operations are consolidated under the appropriate function.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should cross-train additional mail clerks at Campus Support Sites to work Image Control Team (ICT) validations, freeing up additional resources in sites with higher inventories needing to be scanned, or consider shipping inventory to sites with less inventory to be scanned.
The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop specific instructions and a common template for all 10 Image Control Team (ICT) sites to consistently capture ICT inventory information.
Audit of the Reimbursement for Department of Defense Mission Assignments for Coronavirus Disease–2019 Pandemic Response in the U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility
Rec. 1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, in coordination with DoD Component comptrollers, initiate a review of all COVID-19 pandemic response mission assignments to ensure reimbursement requests for costs incurred are submitted in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director, Army Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), immediately require tasked units to review costs incurred for mission assignments 4480DR-NY-DOD-10, 4480DR-NY-DOD-11, 4480DR-NY-DOD-12, and 4481DR-WA-DOD-02 as of July 31, 2020, for completeness and accuracy, and submit reimbursement requests for those costs with required documentation to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Director of the Office of Budget Fiscal Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller), immediately require tasked units to review costs incurred for mission assignments 4482DR-CA-DOD-01, 4482DR-CA-DOD-02, and 4488DR-NJ-DOD-04 as of July 31, 2020, for completeness and accuracy, and submit reimbursement requests for those costs with required documentation to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 2.c: The DoD OIG recommended that the Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller), immediately require tasked units to review costs incurred for mission assignment 4480DR-NY-DOD-10 as of July 31, 2020, for completeness and accuracy, and submit reimbursement requests for those costs with required documentation to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 2.d: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the United States Marine Corps immediately require tasked units to review costs incurred for 4482DR-CA-DOD-01, 4482DR-CA-DOD-02, and 4488DR-NJ-DOD-04 as of July 31, 2020, for completeness and accuracy, and submit reimbursement requests for those costs with required documentation to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 2.e: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the National Guard Bureau immediately require tasked units to review costs incurred for mission assignments 4480DR-NY-DOD-05, 4481DR-WA-DOD-05, 4482DR-CA-DOD-07, and 4491DR-MD-DOD-01 as of July 31, 2020, for completeness and accuracy, as well as any additional costs incurred and identified after July 31, 2020, and submit reimbursement requests for those costs with required documentation to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in accordance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.a.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director, Army Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), in coordination with the Financial Management Augmentation Team, develop and provide to tasked units, an Army-specific desk manual for mission assignments that includes, at a minimum, step-by-step procedures for initial set-up, real-time cost input, cost tracking, cost reporting, and submitting partial and final billings to ensure compliance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.a.2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Director, Army Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) train tasked-unit personnel on how to navigate the Army-specific desk manual and apply the procedures appropriately.
Rec. 3.b.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Director of the Office of Budget Fiscal Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller), in coordination with the Financial Management Augmentation Team, develop and provide to tasked units, a Navy-specific desk manual for mission assignments that includes, at a minimum, step-by-step procedures for initial set-up, real-time cost input, cost tracking, cost reporting, and submitting partial and final billings to ensure compliance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.b.2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Director of the Office of Budget Fiscal Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) train tasked-unit personnel on how to navigate the Navy-specific desk manual and apply the procedures appropriately.
Rec. 3.d.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the United States Marine Corps, in coordination with the Financial Management Augmentation Team, develop and provide to tasked units, a Marine Corps-specific desk manual for mission assignments that includes, at a minimum, step-by-step procedures for initial set-up, real-time cost input, cost tracking, cost reporting, and submitting partial and final billings to ensure compliance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.d.2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the United States Marine Corps train tasked-unit personnel on how to navigate the Marine Corps-specific desk manual and apply the procedures appropriately.
Rec. 3.e.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the Financial Management Augmentation Team, develop and provide to tasked units a National Guard-specific desk manual for mission assignments that includes, at a minimum, step-by-step procedures for initial set-up, real-time cost input, cost tracking, cost reporting, and submitting partial and final billing to ensure compliance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.e.2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Comptroller of the National Guard Bureau train tasked-unit personnel on how to navigate the National Guard-specific desk manuals and apply the procedures appropriately.
Rec. 3.c.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller), in coordination with the Financial Management Augmentation Team, develop and provide to tasked units, an Air Force-specific desk manual for mission assignments that includes, at a minimum, step-by-step procedures for initial set-up, real-time cost input, cost tracking, cost reporting, and submitting partial and final billings to ensure compliance with DoD policy.
Rec. 3.c.2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) train taskeDODIG-unit personnel on how to navigate the Air Force-specific desk manual and apply the procedures appropriately.
Performance Audit of the Implementation of OMB COVID-19 Flexibilities – Florida International University
Resolve the $1,252 in questioned Award Cash Management $ervice drawdowns for which FIU has not agreed to reimburse NSF and direct FIU to repay or otherwise remove the sustained questioned costs from its NSF awards.
Direct FIU to provide documentation supporting that it has repaid or otherwise credited the $14,167 of questioned costs for which it has agreed to reimburse NSF.
Direct FIU to update its administrative and management processes and internal control procedures surrounding the Award Cash Management $ervice for awards with expiring appropriations. Updated processes should ensure FIU appropriately documents how it calculates the final draw amounts for awards with expiring appropriations, to ensure it only uses the draws to cover costs incurred before the appropriation expired.
Direct FIU to strengthen its award set-up processes and procedures to ensure it cannot charge costs to an active award if the Federal appropriations for the award have expired.
Resolve the $791 in questioned fringe benefit costs for which FIU has not agreed to reimburse NSF and direct FIU to repay or otherwise remove the sustained questioned costs from its NSF awards.
Direct FIU to provide documentation supporting that it has repaid or otherwise credited the $5,934 of questioned promotional and salary costs for which it has agreed to reimburse NSF.
Direct FIU to establish clear guidance regarding the <span class="tx-tooltip" tabindex="0">
allowable uses
<span class="tx-tooltip-text">
<span class="cf0">An allowable use is any expenditure on which an entity can spend funding.</span>
</span>
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of participant support cost funding. This guidance should address: a. Allowable uses of participant support cost funding. b. How to verify personnel did not apply fringe benefit rates to participant stipends or other non-salary expenses.
Direct FIU to strengthen its monitoring procedures surrounding costs charged to its NSF Research Experiences for Undergraduates programs. Updated procedures should ensure FIU charges costs associated with promotional and/or other unallowable items to nonFederal funding sources.
Direct FIU to update its current practices to ensure it only applies fringe benefits using fringe benefit rates that have been approved by its cognizant audit agency.
Performance Audit of the Implementation of OMB COVID-19 Flexibilities – State University of New York at Stony Brook
Direct Stony Brook to provide documentation supporting that it has repaid or otherwise credited the $20,530 of questioned Award Cash Management $ervice drawdowns associated with unspent funds.
Direct Stony Brook to update its administrative and management processes and internal control procedures surrounding the Award Cash Management $ervice for awards with expiring appropriations. Updated processes could include validating that Stony Brook only draws down funding based on immediate cash needs and/or adequately documents that any Award Cash Management $ervice draws in excess of its actual expenses support immediate cash needs.
Direct Stony Brook to provide documentation supporting that it has repaid or otherwise credited the $6,913 in questioned travel costs for which it has agreed to reimburse NSF.
Direct Stony Brook to provide additional guidance to ensure personnel reimburse NSF timely for cash drawn down for unused travel advances.
Direct Stony Brook to provide documentation supporting that it has repaid or otherwise credited the $3,898 in questioned travel costs for which it has agreed to reimburse NSF.
Direct Stony Brook to strengthen its monitoring procedures and internal controls surrounding the allocation of travel expenses to sponsored projects. Processes could include reviewing and assessing the allocation of all travel expenses charged to NSF awards.
Direct Stony Brook to separately track its on-campus and off-campus activities so that it can appropriately apply the approved on-campus and off-campus indirect cost rates.
Direct Stony Brook to update its current budget proposal process to eliminate the use of blended indirect cost rates.
Direct Stony Brook to update its current award set-up practices to require that, when setting up accounts established for NSF awards, personnel ensure that the accounts apply indirect costs using the rates that were established in the Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement in effect as of the date of the NSF grant award, rather than using the rates included within the original grant proposal.
Direct Stony Brook to update its current award set-up practices to remove the establishment of indirect cost budget caps.