Reports

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During the 2021 Filing Season

Audit | 5/19/2022

1 - Open

On June 15, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns with the systemic calculation of the allowable RRC amount. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.

10 - Closed

Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child for which the IRS has already paid an EIP or an RRC to someone else and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.

11 - Closed

Review the 7,022 individuals identified in which the IRS issued multiple RRCs for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.

12 - Closed

Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC for a qualifying child who was claimed on more than one tax return and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.

13 - Closed

Review the 75,594 tax returns identified in which the individual is potentially a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.

14 - Closed

Perform analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional tax returns with the same characteristics as those the IRS determined were filed by a nonresident alien and take the actions needed to recover erroneous RRC payments.

15 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should coordinate with the Territories to confirm and recover erroneous RRCs.

16 - Closed

Review the nearly 6.9 million potentially eligible individuals we provided to the IRS who had not filed a Tax Year 2020 tax return as of May 27, 2021, and send a letter to those individuals who still have not filed a Tax Year 2020 return to encourage them to file a return and claim the RRC if eligible.

17 - Closed

Review the 3.1 million eligible individuals we identified who filed a Tax Year 2020 return and proactively issue these taxpayers their credit.

18 - Closed

Conduct additional analysis to identify tax returns filed after May 27, 2021, in which an individual is eligible for the RRC based on their Tax Year 2020 tax return and did not claim the credit, and proactively issue the taxpayer their credit.

19 - Closed

If IRS management does not proactively issue the RRC to individuals who filed a return and did not claim the credit, the IRS should notify these individuals that they are eligible to claim the RRC and should file an amended tax return to claim the credit.

2 - Closed

On March 19, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that an incorrect amount of advance payments was being used to calculate the RRC for some taxpayers. We recommended that IRS management review the returns we identified and provide us with any corrective actions they intended to take.

20 - Closed

Work with the BFS to ensure that individuals who were denied the RRC and have still not activated their EIP1 or EIP2 debit card as of December 31, 2021, have EIPs reversed in their tax account and are issued their RRC. These processes should include notifying Metabank that the debit cards in question are to be cancelled.

21 - Closed

Work with the BFS to obtain recurring data during Processing Year 2022 to identify individuals who have not activated their advance ARPA RRC debit card at the time a return is filed and implement processes to reverse the advance payment so these individuals can receive the RRC on their Tax Year 2021 tax return.

22 - Closed

We alerted the Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, of our concerns that the IRS was unnecessarily burdening taxpayers whose RRC claims were identified for manual ERS review. We recommended the IRS develop processes to systemically adjust RRC claims using the computer-generated RRC calculation.

3 - Open

On April 6, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns regarding ERS tax examiners incorrectly computing the RRC (see management’s action in response to Recommendation 1). We recommended the IRS review the returns we identified and take the actions necessary to ensure that these taxpayers receive the amount of the RRC
they are entitled to receive.

4 - Closed

On March 12, 2021, we alerted IRS management of our concerns that some tax returns were not being identified by fraud filters. We recommended IRS management review the returns we identified and associated fraud filters to identify why these returns were not selected and make programming changes as necessary to ensure proper
identification of returns with potentially questionable claims.

5 - Closed

Conduct analysis to identify Tax Year 2020 RRC claims processed after May 27, 2021, to identify other returns in which ERS tax examiners incorrectly calculated the number of allowable dependents and returns that were not reprocessed per IRS guidance after programming was corrected, and ensure that these taxpayers receive the correct amount of the RRC.

6 - Closed

Review the 14,508 individuals identified in which the IRS issued an RRC to an individual who was claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.

7 - Closed

Conduct analysis of Tax Year 2020 tax returns processed after May 27, 2021, to identify additional individuals who received an RRC and were also claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return but did not check the dependent box, and take the actions needed to recover the RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.

8 - Closed

Review the 238,680 individuals under the age of 25 identified as potential dependents and take the actions needed to recover payments that are determined to be erroneous.

9 - Closed

Review the 15,741 individuals identified in which the individual incorrectly received an RRC and an EIP for the same qualifying child and take the actions needed to recover RRC payments that are determined to be erroneous.

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

The Child Tax Credit Update Portal Was Successfully Deployed, but Security and Process Improvements Are Needed

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

The Veterans Health Administration Needs to Do More to Promote Emotional Well-Being Supports Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Office of Emergency Management issued the initial COVID-19 Response Plan on March 23, 2020, and then an updated version on August 7, 2020. The National Center for Organization Development created a COVID-19 rapid response consultation process for VHA leaders in a supervisory role. The Organizational Health Council developed a team that coordinated with multiple VHA program offices to create a COVID-19 Employee Support Toolkit and other resources. Additionally, several program offices independently created and disseminated employee well-being resources...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

VA’s Compliance with the VA Transparency & Trust Act of 2021

In November 2021, Congress passed the VA Transparency & Trust Act of 2021 to oversee VA’s spending of emergency relief funding related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law requires VA to report to Congress how it will spend the funding and provide biweekly updates thereafter. The law also requires the VA OIG to report within 120 days on whether VA is spending the funds according to its plan and must address waste, fraud, and abuse. This inaugural report focuses on whether the spend plans VA provided to Congress on December 22, 2021, satisfy the requirements of the Transparency Act. VA’s spend...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Program and Organizational Changes Are Needed to Address the Continued Inadequate Tax Account Assistance Provided to Taxpayers

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Audit | 3/18/2022

1 - Closed

On September 20, 2021, we notified the Director, Accounts Management, that the Austin site was not requiring Accounts Management screeners to come into the office to perform their duties, resulting in a significant backlog and delays in inventory being routed to Accounts Management to be worked. We recommended that the IRS establish consistent guidance and clarification on when resources can be directed to the office to help with screening inventory, to ensure that sufficient staff is available to screen documents in a timely manner, and establish processes to monitor the progress,

10 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should update existing scanning software or obtain a new scanning software to
address document capacity concerns.

11 - Open

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure that programming is updated to systemically reject electronic
submissions of Forms 2848 and 8821 when missing one of the five essential elements (name, address, signature, etc.) without manually mailing a rejection letter.

12 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should ensure that the rejection letter used for Forms 2848 and 8821 is updated
to include language that a revised form can be submitted electronically via an IRS Tax Pro Account25 or through Taxpayer Digital Communication.

13 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop an action plan to prioritize the continued expansion of documents that can be sent in via electronic fax and converted into a Correspondence Imaging System (CIS) image.

13 - Closed

Develop an action plan to prioritize the continued expansion of documents that can be sent in via electronic fax and converted into a CIS image.

14 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should Identify priority work that needs to be expedited by the Image Control Team (ICT) and assess the feasibility of creating an electronic fax number to receive this inventory.

15 - Closed

On July 12, 2021, TiGTA notified the Director, Accounts Management, of concerns regarding inaccuracies as it related to the compiling and reporting of the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR). TIGTA recommended that the IRS perform a reconciliation of each Accounts Management site’s AMIR to the source reports to identify inventory inconsistencies and reporting errors by site

16 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should complete the inventory reconciliations for the four remaining Accounts
Management site’s to identify and correct inventory inaccuracies and inconsistencies and implement processes to provide oversight by periodically performing reconciliations for each site so that any future inconsistencies and errors are identified and corrected in a timely manner.

17 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop specific and detailed instructions for preparing the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR), including how controlled and uncontrolled inventory should be captured

18 - Open

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop a process to systemically pull all controlled inventory for each
Accounts Management site for the Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR) to ensure consistency, reduce human error, and
increase efficiencies

19 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should modify Accounts Management inventory reporting to report unassigned
controlled inventory separately on the nationwide Accounts Management Inventory Report (AMIR) and limit the site-specific AMIRs to only
the inventory assigned to be worked in each site.

2 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should evaluate directing taxpayers to send tax account correspondence and
replies intended for Accounts Management directly to Campus Support Sites for processing to reduce backlogs at Tax Processing Centers and improve services to taxpayers.

3 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should prioritize the development and implementation of tools that will enable
taxpayers seeking assistance or responding to Accounts Management to correspond with the IRS electronically, including the ability to directly upload documents into Accounts Management’s inventory.

4 - Closed

The Chief Taxpayer Experience Officer, in conjunction with the Director, IRS NEXT Office, should evaluate establishing two distinct IRS programs as part of the IRS reorganization under the Taxpayer First Act – one dedicated to answering toll-free telephone calls and one dedicated to working Accounts Management inventory – with adequate staffing to provide appropriate service to taxpayers using each channel.

5 - Closed

On June 9, 2021, we notified the Director, Customer Account Services, that Submission Processing requested resources from Accounts Management to assist with clearing the Image Control Team (ICT) backlog and was told by Campus Support management that no resources could be made available to assist with reducing the ICT backlog. We recommended that the IRS assess the availability of Campus Support’s ICT staffing or other resources that could be made available to assist with clearing the ICT backlogs at Tax Processing Centers.

6 - Closed

On September 3, 2021, we notified the Director, Accounts Management, of concerns relating to the newly stood-up Fresno Campus Support Site, including scanners not being used to the full extent possible. We recommended that IRS management provide us with it plans to address our concerns identified with the new Fresno Campus Support Site, including additional staffing to assist Image Control Team (ICT).

7 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should complete a strategic review of all 10 Image Control Team (ICT) sites to determine what contributes to the ICT’s inability to timely scan and validate documents. Based on the results of this review, initiate steps to address the concerns identified. This should include the development of an action plan to ensure that the high-capacity ICT scanners and staffing are realigned to the appropriate sites based on actual or expected inventory levels and that responsibility of the ICT operations are consolidated under the appropriate function.

8 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should cross-train additional mail clerks at Campus Support Sites to work Image Control Team (ICT) validations, freeing up additional resources in sites with higher inventories needing to be scanned, or consider shipping inventory to sites with less inventory to be scanned.

9 - Closed

The Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division, should develop specific instructions and a common template for all 10 Image Control Team (ICT) sites to consistently capture ICT inventory information.

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

Audit of Community Care Consults during COVID-19

During COVID-19, VHA’s Office of Community Care (OCC) took steps to ensure veterans continued to have expanded access to health care in the community, as required by the VA MISSION Act of 2018. OCC issued policies to VA facilities to postpone nonurgent appointments and offer alternatives to in-person care, such as telehealth. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether VHA effectively managed community care consults for routine appointments during the pandemic. The OIG found that routine community care consults were unscheduled for an average of 42 days...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

Systems and Tools Implemented to Track COVID-19 Vaccine Data

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) examined whether the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) implemented data collection and reporting systems to report on the supply of COVID-19 vaccines to VA medical facilities and doses administered to VA employees and veterans enrolled in VA’s healthcare system (approximately 9.5 million individuals). Although essential for national reporting, tracking VA vaccine data is difficult because VA does not have a centralized national pharmacy inventory management system to track vaccine supply at facilities. Although VHA staff swiftly developed data...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor Contract Emergency Supply Strategies Available Before the COVID-19 Pandemic

VA medical facilities’ demand for personal protective equipment (PPE) increased dramatically during the COVID-19 pandemic. The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed how the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) ensured the Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program and its prime vendors met contract requirements by offering medical facilities a no-cost option to develop advance-order supply lists tailored to catastrophic events and contingency plans. The OIG also assessed whether facilities took advantage of those options and strategies and relied on the contracts...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

Review of VHA’s Financial Oversight of COVID-19 Supplemental Funds

In response to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) tracking and reporting of COVID-19 supplemental funding from legislation for pandemic relief. VA met monthly reporting requirements to OMB and Congress on supplemental fund obligations and expenditures. VA also submitted required weekly obligations and expenditures from supplemental funding to OMB by program activity. Of approximately $17.3 billion in medical care supplemental funds, VA reported it had obligated about $7.11...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Department of Veterans Affairs OIG

Use and Oversight of the Emergency Caches Were Limited during the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The OIG assessed how effectively VA managed its emergency caches during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. These caches contain a standard supply of drugs and medical supplies, including some personal protective equipment, for use during a public health emergency. The review team found that use and oversight of the emergency caches were limited. Only nine of 144 medical facilities activated their emergency caches during the review period (February through June 2020). Among the reasons they were not used included medical facility directors reporting supplies were not needed...

Full Details: Oversight.gov Report Page

Date Range

Report Type

Report Category

Submitting Agency

State/Local Agency

State (State and Local Reports)

Fraud Type

Agency Reviewed

Related Organizations

Management Challenges

Any Recommendations

Any Open Recommendations

Reports

Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During the 2021 Filing Season

The Child Tax Credit Update Portal Was Successfully Deployed, but Security and Process Improvements Are Needed

The Veterans Health Administration Needs to Do More to Promote Emotional Well-Being Supports Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic

VA’s Compliance with the VA Transparency & Trust Act of 2021

Program and Organizational Changes Are Needed to Address the Continued Inadequate Tax Account Assistance Provided to Taxpayers

Audit of Community Care Consults during COVID-19

Systems and Tools Implemented to Track COVID-19 Vaccine Data

Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor Contract Emergency Supply Strategies Available Before the COVID-19 Pandemic

Review of VHA’s Financial Oversight of COVID-19 Supplemental Funds

Use and Oversight of the Emergency Caches Were Limited during the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic

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